Hazara Province: Why Has the Demand Survived for So Long?

Hazara is one of the most resilient subnational demands in modern Pakistani history. It has survived across general elections, multiple ruling coalitions in Peshawar and Islamabad, and repeated official declarations that the country’s administrative priorities lie elsewhere.

In August 2026, Federal Minister Sardar Mohammad Yousaf publicly reiterated the demand for an independent Hazara province, recalling that the movement had maintained unbroken political momentum since April 2010 and that the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had endorsed resolutions supporting its creation in 2014, 2018, and 2020.

While such public declarations reflect political positioning rather than independent public-opinion surveys, they highlight a crucial institutional reality: the Hazara issue possesses the deep organizational roots and regional elite consensus necessary to remain permanently on Pakistan’s constitutional agenda.

The demographic and geographic profile of Hazara

According to the official 7th Population and Housing Census 2023, Hazara Division comprises 5.67 million citizens distributed across eight administrative districts in northeastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:

With 5.7 million inhabitants, a prospective Hazara province would be significantly larger than several existing federal entities in other world federations, and roughly 40% the demographic size of Balochistan (14.89M). It controls the vital strategic corridor of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), alongside vital national hydroelectric assets including Tarbela, Dasu, and Suki Kinari.

The 18th Amendment catalyst: identity and recognition

The contemporary Hazara movement cannot be separated from the constitutional politics of the 18th Amendment in April 2010. When the federal parliament renamed North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the move was widely celebrated as long-overdue constitutional recognition of Pashtun national identity.

However, for the non-Pashto speaking populations of the Hazara region—predominantly Hindko, Gujari, and Kohistani speakers—the renaming generated acute political anxiety. Regional leaders argued that substituting a geographic name with an ethnic one turned them into permanent cultural minorities within their own province.

As observed in PIDE’s research on territorial reorganization, federal reforms that empower provincial majorities often inadvertently heighten the marginalization fears of linguistic and regional sub-minorities living within those provinces.

Identity vs administration: a false dichotomy

Critics frequently attempt to dismiss the Hazara demand by labeling it as purely ethnic agitation, while proponents often claim it is strictly an administrative necessity. Both claims are incomplete:

• The Administrative Reality: Reaching Peshawar from Abbottabad, Mansehra, or Kohistan requires traversing the Margalla pass, Punjab territory (via Hassanabdal and Attock), or lengthy detour routes. For a resident of Upper Kohistan, travelling to the provincial high court or secretariat in Peshawar involves a grueling 10-to-12 hour mountain journey.
• The Political Voice Reality: Hazara holds approximately 18 general seats in a 145-member Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly (roughly 12% of the house). Regional politicians argue they can never command the legislative weight necessary to shape provincial priorities in Peshawar.

The Article 239(4) constitutional roadblock

While the political demand is vociferous, it confronts the formidable constitutional safeguard embedded in Article 239(4)(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan:

This provision establishes a profound institutional asymmetry. While the KP Assembly passed non-binding political resolutions supporting Hazara province in 2014, 2018, and 2020, passing a formal, legally binding constitutional amendment requires 97 votes out of 145 total members in Peshawar.

Because Hazara legislators control fewer than 25 seats overall, creating a new province requires securing the consent of over 70 legislators representing Pashtun-majority southern and central divisions (Peshawar, Mardan, Swat, Malakand, Bannu, D.I. Khan). Where mainstream provincial political parties fear territorial truncation, Article 239(4) operates as a permanent constitutional veto.

Fiscal viability and revenue modeling

If Hazara were established as a province, could it finance its public administration? PPRI has analyzed the fiscal architecture of the proposed territory:

Requirements for a governable Hazara proposal

To advance from an emotive political slogan into a serious legislative roadmap, any future Hazara province initiative must provide concrete answers to five institutional tests:

1. Delineated Territorial Boundaries: Clear demarcation of whether Kohistan districts (Upper Kohistan, Lower Kohistan, Kolai-Palas) and Torghar consent to inclusion or prefer alternative divisional status.
2. Institutional Capital Location: Resolving the regional rivalry between Abbottabad (administrative/educational center) and Haripur/Mansehra for the provincial assembly and high court principal seat.
3. Protection of Internal Minorities: Constitutional and statutory protections for non-Hindko linguistic minorities living in Kohistan, Battagram, and Torghar.
4. Recurrent Overhead Feasibility: Demonstrating how the new provincial exchequer will fund a 40-member assembly, high court benches, and civil secretariats without consuming development capital.
5. Article 140A Devolution Guarantee: Statutory commitments ensuring that municipal authorities in Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra retain autonomous local powers rather than being subordinated to a new provincial capital.